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Pushed by national politics or pulled by localism?
Voting for independent local parties in the
Netherlands
Simon Otjes
University of Groningen Documentation Centre for Dutch Political Parties (DNPP),
Groningen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This study examines why citizens in the Netherlands vote for independent
local parties. These are parties that run in municipal council elections, but do
not run in elections at higher levels. This article examines a number of
expectations: namely that voters vote for these parties out dissatisfaction
with established parties, that they do so because they have a 'localist' political
orientation or that they do so because their own national party is not running
in the municipal elections. More support is found for the idea that voters vote
for local parties because they are pushed away by national parties (either
because they do not participate in some municipalities or because voters
distrust them) than for the idea that voters vote for local parties for positive
reasons, such as a localist political orientation. This article examines two
surveys concerning voting behaviour in the 2014 Dutch municipal elections.
KEYWORDS Independent local parties; voting behaviour; the Netherlands; political trust
1. Introduction
This study examines why citizens vote for independent local parties. These
are parties that run in municipal elections but do not run in elections at
higher levels, speciﬁcally the national level. There is limited systematic
research into these parties and the most advanced research to date is
focused on organisational and institutional features (Reiser and Holtmann
2008). To the knowledge of the author, there is no study that identiﬁes the
motivations why voters vote for independent local parties. The core ques-
tion of this article is under what conditions do voters vote for independent
local parties.
Research into the voters of independent local parties is relevant for two
reasons. First, because they are often linked to political dissatisfaction (e.g.,
Boogers and Voerman 2010, 79). Yet, there is no empirical evidence that the
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motivation to vote for these parties is distrust of established parties, instead of
‘localism’ (Copus and Wingfeld 2014) or the even the absence of some
national parties. This article tests these diﬀerent notions. Is the success of
these parties based on pull factors related to the appeal of these parties or
factors pushing voters away from established political parties?
Second, because in many countries these parties are on the rise and are an
important political player at the municipal level (Boogers and Voerman 2010).
These parties are larger in municipal councils than established national parties in
German states such as Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, Austrian states like
Voralberg and Tyrol, and in countries such as the Netherlands (Angenendt
2015; Ennser-Jedenastik and Hansen 2013). Why people vote for independent
local parties is as relevant a question as why they vote for Christian democrats,
social democrats or liberals. These parties garner asmuch support. This article will
focus on the Dutch case, but as it will be argued in greater detail below, it seems
credible that the results found here may be relevant for a number of countries
that have a similar electoral system and a similar party system at the local level.
This is especially the case for the Nordic countries, Germany and Austria.
The labelling of independent local parties diﬀers from study to study and
from country to country. Some studies call these ‘non-national parties’
(Erlingsson 2008). Many studies do not use the ‘party’ label, but instead












Figure 1. Results of independent local parties in the Netherlands 1986-2014.
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refer to ‘non-partisan lists’ (Aars and Ringkjøb 2005, 167), ‘independent local
lists’ (Holtman 2008), ‘local lists of independent candidates’, (Åberg and
Ahlberger 2015, 813), ‘non-partisan groups’ (Angenendt 2015) or ‘citizens’
groups’ (De Almeida 2007, 233). The reason for this is that in some countries,
such as Germany, the label ‘party’ legally is reserved for those groups that
ﬁeld lists for national elections (Angenendt 2015, 128). This study will use the
term ‘independent local party’, as these organisations are ‘parties’ in the sense
that they ﬁeld lists of candidates for elections (Ware 1996, 5). These groups are
‘local’ in the sense that they are organised exclusively at the municipal level.1
They are ‘independent’ in the sense that they are not aﬃliated in any way with
national political parties.
This article will have the following structure: ﬁrst, it will discuss the theore-
tical expectations of why voters may choose to vote for an independent local
party. Second, it will introduce the case that will be the focus of this study.
Third, it will discuss the two data sets that will be used to study the phenom-
enon. Next the results will be presented. Finally, the implications of the
research will be discussed.
2. Theory
This study will examine three explanations of why voters vote for indepen-
dent local parties: dissatisfaction with established parties, localism and the
absence of national parties in some municipal council elections.
2.1. Political distrust
The ﬁrst pattern that may underlie why voters vote for an independent local
party is because they no longer have conﬁdence in established political parties.
The link between political distrust and independent local parties has been
touched upon by a large number of authors: the idea is that independent
local political parties are successful ‘when established alternatives fail’ as Hauss
and Rayside (1978) propose in their seminal study of new party formation. Lago
and Martínez (2011) show that in Spanish regions new parties, often indepen-
dent from national political parties, form where earlier citizens have shown to
be dissatisﬁedwith politics. Independent local parties have often been founded
by citizens who are themselves dissatisﬁed with the ‘arrogance’ of the ‘estab-
lished system’ (Zouridis, Tops, and Voerman 1994, 79). In their study of
Norwegian independent local lists, Aars and Ringkjøb (2007, 4) observe that
three out of four independent local parties were founded out of dissatisfaction
with established political parties. In their study of Dutch independent local
parties, Boogers and Voerman (2010, 85) characterised a quarter of these
parties as ‘protest parties’. These independent politicians are often more dis-
trustful of national politics, the national parliament and established political
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parties compared to other politicians (Copus andWingfeld 2014, 661; Gendźwiłł
2012, 510). Studies also point to the appeals these independent local parties
make, that are often characterised as populist or anti-political, articulating
popular dissatisfaction with established political parties (Angenendt 2015,
135; Boogers and Voerman 2010, 78; Holtman 2008, 13). These appeals are
populist in the sense that they make a distinction between the homogeneous
and virtuous people and corrupt elite and argue that instead of the being
controlled by the elite, politics should be an expression of the political will
(Mudde 2004, 543). In their analysis of the manifestos of a selected set of
independent local parties in the Netherlands, Boogers, Lucardie, and
Voerman (2007) found that the only ideological trait all the selected parties
shared was their populism. As will be discussed below, the history of Dutch
populism at the national level is intrinsically linked to the history of local parties.
Therefore, it is credible that one dividing line these parties use to mobilise
voters is the division between the establishment and anti-establishment
(Boogers and Voerman 2010, 86). By casting their vote not for an established
political party, but for an independent local party, voters can express their
overall dissatisfaction with mainstream politics, whether national or local level
(Boogers and Voerman 2010, 79–80).
(1) Political Trust Hypothesis: The lower the political trust of voters, the
more likely they are to vote for an independent local party.
2.2. Localism
Independent local political parties may not only be protest parties. Many can
also be characterised by a ‘localist’ orientation (Boogers and Voerman 2010, 85).
As independent local political parties, they may represent the speciﬁc needs of
the local community, unconstrained by the ideologies of national political
parties. As Åberg and Ahlberger (2015, 817) put it succinctly: ‘the business of
municipal parties is the locality’. The local community’s needs can take many
forms: in some speciﬁc cases these independent local parties are founded to
save the local hospital or to improve the traﬃc congestion in their town
(Bottom & Crow, 2011, 220). These parties may mobilise voters in defence of
the interest of their local community with its own traditions and idiosyncrasies
against the metropolitan expansionism (Åberg and Ahlberger 2015, 817). They
may also be formed to express a ‘Not In My Backyard’ sentiment towards
environmental pollution (Åberg and Ahlberger 2015, 817; Bottom & Crow,
2011, 222). In their study of independent local political parties in the
Netherlands, Boogers and Voerman (2010, 85) characterise a majority of them
as ‘localist’. In line with this, Aars and Ringkjøb (2007, 4) show that more than
half of the Norwegian independent political parties were founded in order to
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rally the local community. As such these parties may mobilise voters on the
dividing line between the local and national level (Boogers and Voerman 2010,
88). Copus and Wingfeld (2014, 664) develop a more speciﬁc conception of
localism: they understand it as support for the interest of their community and
support for autonomy for the municipal level. We follow this conceptualisation:
localism is understood as support autonomy for the municipal level and sup-
port for the local community, which is operationalised as identiﬁcation with this
level.
(2) Local Autonomy Hypothesis: The more voters favour local auton-
omy, the more likely they are to vote for an independent local party.
(3) Identiﬁcation Hypothesis: The more voters identify with local poli-
ties, the more likely they are to vote for an independent local party.
Because of this localist orientation, these parties are independent of the
ideological left or right (Åberg and Ahlberger 2015, 815; Copus and Wingfeld
2014, 654). At the same time, there is considerable programmatic and ideolo-
gical heterogeneity among independent local parties (Angenendt 2015, 127;
Boogers and Voerman 2010, 84). This heterogeneity means that it will be
diﬃcult to catch the reasons why voters vote for an independent local political
party in a national survey as this choice may often reﬂect speciﬁc local interests
and needs, but also the ideological orientation of these independent local
parties: they may be more left or right-wing, more conservative or more
progressive from municipality to municipality. It would be notable if despite
this heterogeneity, one would ﬁnd a consistent ideological orientation among
the supporters of independent local parties.
2.3. Supply side
In the literature on independent local political parties, one thing is speciﬁcally
clear: the smaller municipalities are, the stronger independent local political
parties are and conversely the weaker national political parties are. This pattern
has been found in Denmark (Kjaer and Elklit 2010, 439), Italy (Vampa 2016, 583),
Germany (Göhlert et al. 2008), Norway (Aars and Ringkjøb 2005, 172) and the
Netherlands (Janssen and Korsten 2003). On the one hand, national parties are
less likely to compete in smaller municipalities, leaving space for independent
local parties, for a number of reasons: ﬁrst, larger communities are more likely to
be heterogeneous. More heterogeneous populations will see a more complex
cleavage structure (Kjaer and Elklit 2010, 437). Therefore, ceteris paribus, national
political parties will compete in larger municipalities where their own speciﬁc
electoral niches are represented. Second, there is a higher natural threshold in
smaller municipalities; this makes it less interesting for parties with small
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constituencies in these municipalities to compete (Kjaer and Elklit 2010, 439).
Third, winning larger cities is strategically more important for national political
parties (Vampa 2016, 583). Finally, national parties are more likely to reach larger
towns to recruit members (Vampa 2016, 583). On the other side, it is relatively
easy to forman independent local party in a smaller localmunicipality buildingon
local networks in towns where everyone knows each other (Janssen and Korsten
2003).
All in all, these arguments are not as much about size of municipalities
but about the extent to which established parties participate in local elec-
tions: the lower the numbers of established national parties competing in a
municipality are, the more space there is for independent local parties, as
there are more ‘ﬂoating’ voters. It is more costly and less advantageous for
national parties to compete in small municipalities; therefore, this phenom-
enon is most prevalent in smaller municipalities. As this study focuses on the
individual level, one can reword this hypothesis for the voter level:
(4) Supply-Side Hypothesis: Those who voted for a national party that
did not run in the municipal elections in their municipality are more
likely to vote for an independent local party than those who voted for
a national party that does run in their municipality.
Still, in addition to this ‘mechanical’ eﬀect of the supply side that may
underlie why independent local parties are stronger in smaller municipalities,
there may be a residual eﬀect of the size on the likelihood that voters vote for
local parties, which will be included as a control variable.
3. Country selection and description
Municipal electoral politics is located within particular cultural and institutional
contexts. The reasons why voters vote for independent local parties in one
country cannot be immediately transferred to another country. Careful selection
of the country may yield results that are relevant for other countries that are
suﬃciently similar. This article examines the reasons why voters vote for inde-
pendent local parties. This study focuses on West European countries that use a
list-electoral system to elect their municipal councils. This study examines a West
European democracy as opposed to more recently democratised countries from
Central and Eastern European countries, because in many of these countries the
formation of independent local parties is tied to the speciﬁcities of the patterns of
democratisation (Gendźwiłł 2012, 505) or systemic instability in electoral results
due to a lack of institutionalisation of the supply side. This study focuses on a
country that uses a list system as opposed to candidates being elected with a
personal mandate or mixed systems, like the UK or France, because in the latter
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kind of systems the line between an independent councillor and a representative
for an independent local party is more diﬃcult to make.
Table 1 lists all West European countries that meet the three criteria listed
above, drawing the electoral systems from Van Der Kolk (2007). This study will
focus on a country that is in top in terms of the support for independent local
parties, from this list, because this gives one the ample number of respondents
that actually has voted for independent local parties. The highest level of support
for independent local parties can be found in Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands. The Netherlands is preferred over the former two for a number of
reasons: in Belgium, the situation is complicated by the diﬀerent types of lists
running in local elections (Steyvers et al. 2008, 171). In Belgium, insteadof running
under the banner of a national party, local branches of national parties often form
cartels with branches of other parties or ﬁeld a list with candidates fromanational
and independent local party. Moreover, the situation in Belgium is made more
complex by the diﬀerences between the regions of Flanders, Brussels and
Wallonia. In Germany, the situation is complicated by the fact that municipal
elections are a state responsibility and therefore diﬀerent electoral systems are
used in diﬀerent states, includingmixed electoral systems in some states (VanDer
Kolk 2007, 164) and these elections are not held at the samemoment. This limits
the ability to perform a single national level survey of these voters.
Therefore, the Netherland is selected to study voting for independent local
parties. The Netherlands is a unitary state. Municipal councils are elected every
4 years. All elections in all municipalities are held on the same day.2 The
electoral system is list proportional representation with no threshold other
than the natural threshold due to assembly size (ranging therefore from 3%
Table 1. Share of the vote for non-national parties.
Country
Share of the vote for
non-national parties Election year Source
Austriab 14.9% 1985–2009 Ennser-Jedenastik and Hansen (2013)
Belgium
Walloniac 59.1% 2000 Steyvers et al. (2008, 181)
Flandersc 33.7% 2000 Steyvers et al. (2008, 181)
Denmark 5.0% 2013 Bjørnager (2013)
Finland 2.1% 2017 Yle.ﬁ (2017)
Germanya 35.5% 2003–2008 Angenendt (2015, 130)
Netherlands 27.8% 2014 Verkiezingsuitslagen (2014)
Portugal 6.9% 2013 CNE (2013)
Norway 4.6% 2015 Valgregultalt.no (2015)
Spain 17.4% 2015 Infoelectoral.mir.es (2015)
Sweden 4.1% 2014 Val.se (2014)
aResults of lists not part of national parties in the municipal elections in the most recent year before
2008 for the city councils in the German states excluding Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin.
bAverage result of independent local lists in the municipal elections between municipal elections 1985
and 2009.
cResult for local lists in the 2000 municipal elections in the constituencies in which they run. Wallonia
includes cartel lists of multiple national parties.
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to 11%). This makes the system relatively open to the formation of new and
independent local parties. The recent history of independent local parties is
intertwined with the history of populism in the Netherlands. Historically, inde-
pendent local parties were strong in the Catholic south. In this region, the
Catholic People’s Party (Katholieke Volkspartij) got more than 80% of the vote in
the national elections in many municipalities. It chose not to compete in many
municipal elections leaving it to local lists unless other national parties chose to
compete in those regions (Janssen and Korsten 2003). As the Catholic party
declined in the 1960s and 1970s in national elections, other national parties
began competing in these municipalities and therefore this practice of non-
interference crumbled and with it these local parties. In the 1990s there was a
revival of independent local parties, as can be seen in Figure 1. In parallel
national elections saw large volatility. Local parties were formed in a number of
larger municipalities. Many ran under the banner ‘Leefbaar’ (Liveable) but
without forming a national organisation (Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 71–72).
Before that independent local parties were mainly concentrated in rural areas.
In 1993 Leefbaar Hilversum was founded. In 1998 they were followed by
Leefbaar Utrecht. The rhetoric of both parties had populist characteristics
(Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 72–74). In 1999 the two parties took the initiative
to form a national party, Leefbaar Nederland (Lucardie and Voerman 2012,
76–77). This party however did not have formal ties to these independent
local parties. In 2002 the new party recruited Pim Fortuyn a former
Rotterdam sociology professor and a critic of the Dutch immigration and civic
integration policy as its top candidate (Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 79).
Fortuyn and the founders of Leefbaar Nederland disagreed over the party’s
course, speciﬁcally on the issue of immigration (Lucardie and Voerman 2012,
84). Pim Fortuyn split and formed his own party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim
Fortuyn, LPF), which focused on immigration. Fortuyn was killed days before
the 2002 election and the LPF won 17% of the seats, unprecedented for a new
party in the Netherlands. LNwon 2%of the vote. With that right-wing populism
had won a permanent position in the Dutch national parliament as a descen-
dant of this wave of independent local parties in the 1990s. In 2006 the
leaderless LPF lost representation in the Tweede Kamer, but in that election a
new anti-immigrant party, the Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid), immedi-
ately occupied that void. The Freedom Party did not contest municipal elec-
tions until 2010 and it only ran in two municipalities, leaving space for
independent local parties. Meanwhile independent local parties continued to
grow. In the 2002 municipal elections the parties won 26% of the vote, includ-
ing more than a third of the votes in Rotterdam, the second city of the
Netherlands. They were the largest political group in all municipal councils
combined. In 2016 the 2002 result was topped: the independent local parties
won 28% of the vote.
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The story below will feature some of the national Dutch parties: the main
established parties Christian-Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch
Appèl), the right-wing Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie),
the social-democratic Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid). On the anti-estab-
lishment side there is the right-wing populist Freedom Party, but also the
left-wing populist Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij), the pensioners’ party
50Plus and the animal-advocacy party Animals Party (Partij voor de Dieren).
The Netherlands also has small protestant parties, which are relevant for our
discussion, the Political Reformed Party (Staatkundige Gereformeerde Partij,
SGP) and the ChristianUnion (ChristenUnie).
By selecting the Netherlands as a case, we also delineate for what kind of cases
our results are relevant. These are likely to be countries that have a similar
electoral system, party system and history of democracy. This means that context
for independent local parties in the Netherlands is similar to that of German
independent local lists, and although these parties are larger in size in the
Netherlands, the situation also is similar for Austria, Portugal, Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden. Given the complexities of the Spanish systems with its
strong regionalist parties (Lago andMartínez 2011), it is less likely that the results
can be generalised to this system. The results are also less generalisable to more
recently democratised systems in Central and Eastern Europe or systems where
councillors get a personal mandate instead of a party mandate (the UK, France,
Ireland and Italy). In some countries using a personal mandate system such as
Australia and New Zealand, independent local parties and independent candi-
dates dominate these elections, due to the norm that local and national politics
should remain apart. A study of support for independent local parties in a system
where national parties also compete in elections is unlikely to be relevant for
understanding voting behaviour in such systems.
4. Methods
This article employs two data sets to examine the hypotheses. Both have their
own strengths and weaknesses. The ﬁrst is the Dutch Local Election Study
(DLES) (Van Der Meer and Van Der Kolk 2016) and the second is the Region
North Panel (RNP). The DLES was a study organised by the same organisation
that organises the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies. It uses the internet
panel of the Longitudinal Internet Studies for Social Science (LISS). The LISS
consists out of a representative sample of the entire Dutch voting age popula-
tion as respondents are drawn from the Central Bureau of Statistics database of
the Dutch population (formore information see Van DerMeer and Van Der Kolk
2016). The study has a response rate of 82%. The DLES also oﬀers a large
number of additional opinion variables that can be used as control variables.
For this research project this DLES has two main disadvantages: ﬁrst, the LISS
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prizes anonymity of respondents. One rule is that the municipality in which
respondents live cannot be derived from the data. This is problematic for the
supply-side hypothesis, which requires one to know which parties ran in the
municipal elections in the municipality where respondents live. Second, it was
held in 2016with respondents recalling their vote in 2014 elections. Appendix 1
lists the full questions of the items used from the DLES.
The second study used is the RNP. This is a self-registered internet panel
exclusively oriented at the three northern provinces in the Netherlands. The
response rate of the RNP was 38%. The RNP is not a representative sample
of the Dutch population or even the population in this region. Compared to
the LISS men and higher educated voters are overrepresented (see Tables 1
and 2). From a methodological perspective, the DLES is far superior. The
RNP, however, has two advantages over the DLES: this study was held in
March 2014, starting the day after the local elections. Moreover, in this study
one can link respondents to municipalities and therefore the parties that ran
in those elections. All in all, RNP is meant as a robustness check on the DLES,
in particular where it comes to the mechanics of the supply-side hypothesis.
Appendix 2 lists the full questions of the items used from the RNP.
The dependent variable is the choice for an independent local party in
the 2014 municipal elections in the Netherlands. In the DLES this was
operationalised as whether respondents voted for a national party or not
(operationalisation performed by the DLES coders).3 Do note however that
the DLES has a good representative sample of the Dutch population and a
fair share of voters did not turn out for the elections (46%), these voters
have missing values. In the RNP the question only concerned the 2014
elections. Here, voting for a local party is operationalised as voting for a
party that was active in only one municipality. Given the binary nature of the
dependent variable, logistic regression is employed.
To test the political trust hypothesis, a measure of political trust is employed.
Trust in the municipal and national government is included separately in
analyses as well together to measure political trust in general. The DLES has
three items on trust in the national government (combining items on satisfac-
tion with national democracy and trust in the government and parliament),
which are taken together as a scale. It has ﬁve items on trust in the municipal
government (combining items on satisfaction with municipal democracy and
trust in the municipal executive council, the mayor, municipal council and
municipal councillors), which are also taken together. Combined these become
an eight-item scale on general political trust. The fact that all these items can be
combined in a scale implies that the two scales are likely to be highly correlated
(Pearson’s r is 0.68). The RNP has four items that can be taken together in a scale
concerning trust in the national government and members of parliament, as
well as four items that can be taken together to measure trust in the municipal
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government and municipal councillors. These combine to an eight-item scale.
The Pearson’s r between the two scales is 0.38. To assess scalability, Mokken
scaling was used. All these trust scales exceed basic requirements of scalability
of a Loevinger’s H of 0.3 (see Tables 2 and 3).
The local autonomy hypothesis can only be tested for the DLES, as the RNP
did not include items on institutional design. The DLES asked respondents to
indicate the importance they attached to the principle that ‘municipalities can
decide on many issues autonomously’ and it asked respondents to assess to
what extent they were satisﬁed with implementation of this principle in
practice. Respondents made both assessments on a ten-point scale. The
diﬀerence between the importance that voters attach to this and their assess-
ment of the implementation is a good indication of to what extent they want
more local autonomy.
To test the identiﬁcation hypothesis, the DLES oﬀers three variables that
concern to what extent voters feel attached to their region, municipality and
village/district to form a scale. These items scale well. In the RNP, identiﬁcation
was measured with an indicator developed by Moreno, Arriba, and Serrano
(1998) to measure regional identiﬁcation. It asks respondents whether they
identify as exclusively Dutch or as their provincial demonym on ﬁve-point scale.
To test the supply-side hypothesis, the DLES is problematic because it does
not report directly in which municipality respondents live. Therefore, the share
of municipalities that the party the respondent voted for the 2012 election ran
in during the 2014 municipal elections was calculated. This was weighted by
voting age population. This is a proxy of the chance that the national party a
respondent voted for is not running in the local election. Also note that as the
DLES is a representative sample of the Dutch population and a quarter of
eligible voters did not vote in the 2012 national elections, the values for
those cases are missing. In the RNP one can check directly whether the party
the respondent voted for in the 2012 national election actually ran in the 2014
municipal election in the municipality where the respondent resides. This is a
more direct test of the hypothesis.
A number of control variables are added: the size of the municipality (in
four categories),4 gender (with male being one), year of birth and education
level (split between those who graduated a research university or a university
of applied sciences and those who did not) are included in both the RNP and
DLES analyses. The DLES oﬀers a number of additional political opinion
variables: a two-item economic egalitarianism scale, a two-item new cultural
scale, concerning issues such as immigration, and an item concerning the old
cultural dimension, speciﬁcally closing shops on Sunday. The scales meet
basic scaling requirements in terms of the Loevinger’s H although the scales
are weaker than the trust scales. All variables are standardised so that their
maximum is one and their minimum is zero.
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5. Results
Six models are presented in Tables 4 and 5, the ﬁrst four concern the DLES
and the last two the RNP. The ﬁrst two DLES models do not control for the
three opinion control variables, while the second two do. For each of these
options (RNP, DLES with and without the opinion items), separate models
were run with the national and local political trust variables included sepa-
rately in the ﬁrst model and the second combines them.
The ﬁrst hypothesis is the political trust hypothesis. The core idea is that
voters who do not trust national politicians are more likely to vote for local
parties. There is a strong negative relationship between the likelihood of
voting for a local party and national political trust in each of the three
models (both the DLES and RNP models). Those who trust national politics
most are 93–95% less likely to vote for local parties, compared to those who
have least trust in national politics. The relationship between local political
Table 4. Logistic regressions models based on DLES.











































































































N 1084 1084 960 960
AIC 1013 1028 897 907
aReference category: ‘other’
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trust and voting for local parties is not signiﬁcant in DLES model but is
signiﬁcant in the RNP model, but both are in the same direction. If we
combined national and local political trust, those who have the most trust in
politics in general are 88–95% less likely to vote for local parties, compared
to those who have least trust in politics. These results clearly show that
those who have less faith in politics are more likely to vote for independent
local parties, as hypothesised.
The next two hypotheses concern localism. This is split into two dimensions:
local autonomy and local identiﬁcation. First, local autonomy hypothesis is
examined. This can only be tested in the DLES. In each of DLES models there
is a signiﬁcant result (but three out of four are only signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level):
those who want more municipal autonomy than they perceive to be the case
support independent local parties more than those who are satisﬁed with the
level of autonomy. They are about ﬁve times more likely to vote for an
independent local party. The local autonomy hypothesis is corroborated but
out of all corroborated hypotheses, evidence is weakest here. Second, local
identiﬁcation is studied. The core idea is that voters who identify more with
their own region are more likely to vote for a local party. The evidence here is
weak. Signiﬁcant patterns (in the expected direction) are only found in one of
the DLES models and one of the RNP models. These results are only signiﬁcant
at the 0.1 level. In these models those who have the strongest local identiﬁca-
tion are 67–109%more likely to vote for an independent local party compared
Table 5. Logistic regressions models based on RNP.
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to those who have the weakest local identiﬁcation. To understand the weak-
ness of these results it is useful to delve into the operationalisations: in the DLES
three items concerning identiﬁcation with one’s village or district, municipality
and one’s region. In Appendix 3, the three items included in the identiﬁcation
scale are included in separate analyses. Here, one can see that out of three
options identifying with one’s village is signiﬁcantly correlated to voting for an
independent local party. This is interesting because when smaller municipali-
ties were merged into larger municipalities in the Netherlands, independent
local parties were formed to defend the interests of the villages amalgamated
into these municipalities (Janssen and Korsten 2003). These voters may vote
because they want a party that serves the need of the local community they
identify, but this is not themunicipality. In the RNP identiﬁcation ismeasured as
provincial versus national identiﬁcation. In Appendix 4, voting for a local list of
the provincially active Frisian National Party (Fryske Nasjonale Partij, FNP) is
included in the dependent variable. In that case, provincial identiﬁcation has a
clear eﬀect on voting for ‘independent parties’. All in all, there is insuﬃcient
evidence to support the notion that those who identify more with their
municipality tend to vote for more local parties than those who do not, rather
for as far as there is a relation with subnational identiﬁcation, it appears to be
those who identify with either their province or their village.
The fourth hypothesis is the supply-side hypothesis. The underlying idea is
that voters who prefer parties that do not run in themunicipal elections in their
municipality are more likely to vote for a local party. There is ample support for
this in the RNP and DLES. The diﬀerence between the strength in the relation-
ships is linked to the diﬀerences in the measurement. In the RNP, the value is
either one or zero, depending on whether the party one voted for in the
national elections participated in the municipal elections. In the DLES, the
value ranges from zero to one, depending on in how many municipalities in
the party one voted for in the national elections participated. The analysis in the
RNP indicates that voting for a party in the national elections that does run in
the municipal elections in one’s municipality makes one 56–63% more likely to
vote for an independent local party compared to voting for a party that does
run in the municipal election. The analysis in the DLES shows that those who
vote for a party that runs in municipal elections the least are four to ﬁve times
more likely to vote for an independent local party compared to those who vote
a party that runs in municipal elections the most. The results are weaker in the
RNP than in the DLES, implying that perhaps the eﬀect of the non-participation
is not the same for every party. The parties that participate in municipal
elections the least are the pensioners’ party 50Plus, the Freedom Party and
the Party for the Animals. In the Models 1 and 2 in the Appendix 3, one can see
that voters who voted for these parties are far more likely to vote for an
independent local party than those who voted for the parties that are next in
the list (the small Christian parties SGP and ChristianUnion). The results show
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that in line with the expectations that those who voted for a national party that
did not run in the municipal elections in their municipality, are more likely to
vote for an independent local party than those who voted for a national party
that does run in their municipality.
Finally, there are the control variables: ﬁrst, municipal size. In the analysis on
the DLES there is a consistent relationship: there is less support for independent
local parties in the largest 41 municipalities compared to the other rural and in-
between municipalities. The support declines by almost 80% when comparing
the largest four municipalities with rural municipalities. This pattern is not
present in the RNP data, perhaps because there are only a limited number of
large municipalities in the less sparsely populated Northern three provinces. In
none of the analyses, there is a relationship between gender, year of birth and
education level. Three opinion dimensions are included in the DLES. Voters of
local parties are more likely to have progressive views on old cultural issues:
voters with the most progressive views on these moral issues are two-and-half
times more likely to vote for an independent local party, compared to voters
with the most conservative views on these issues. This may reﬂect the fact
discussed above that voters who vote small Christian parties in national elec-
tions are less likely to support local parties than voters of secular parties. The
two small protestant parties only run in 13% and 18% of the municipalities.
Instead of choosing for a secular local party, these voters may vote for a larger
Christian-democratic party. This seems reasonable as these independent local
parties appeal to ﬂoating voters, who freed themselves from religious commu-
nities (Janssen and Korsten 2003). Voters of local parties are more likely to have
conservative views on immigration and law-and-order issues. Those who stand
on the progressive side of this dimension are three times less likely to vote for
an independent local party, compared to those on the conservative side of this
dimension. This may reﬂect the fact discussed above that voters with more
conservative views on immigration that are more likely to vote for the Freedom
Party in national elections vote for local parties in municipal elections. Even in
the model with the separate variable for support for the anti-immigration
Freedom Party (in Appendix 3), there is a signiﬁcant relationship between
having conservative views on new cultural issues and supporting independent
local parties. There is no relationship with views on social-economic issues and
voting for independent local parties in general.
6. Conclusion
This article examined the reasons voters had for voting for independent
local parties in the Netherlands. Four patterns that may underlie why voters
choose independent local parties were proposed: dissatisfaction with estab-
lished politics, a localist orientation, support for local autonomy and the
absence of the party of one’s ﬁrst preference. If one looks at these factors,
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distrust of established politics and in particular distrust of national politics
drives voters to vote for independent local parties. Not being able to vote
for the party that one voted for at the national level is a secondary factor,
although this applies in particular to relatively new parties that have an anti-
establishment orientation such as the Freedom Party and the Socialist Party.
There is more limited support for the notion that these parties appeal in
particular to those who have a localist orientation, although there is that
voters who desire more local autonomy than they perceive to be the case
support these parties.
The strength of the patterns that tap into (satisfaction with and parti-
cipation of) national political parties compared to those that tap into local
factors shows that the choice for an independent local party is mainly a
negative choice. This is further sustained when one considers the appeal
that these parties have under those who have more conservative views
on new cultural issues, such as immigration. The rise of these new cultural
issues is linked to globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2008): instead of turning to
national parties, voters that desire protection from globalisation turn to
independent local parties. The reason for this may be that because
established political parties tend to take progressive positions on these
national new cultural issues they have alienated voters from them. These
voters sought for new options, also at the local level. This pattern is
particularly notable given that there is a mix of independent local parties
with diﬀerent ideological proﬁles: including both left-wing and right-wing
and progressive and conservative parties (Boogers, Lucardie, and Voerman
2007). Moreover, this is notable, because the extent to which these parties
can actually aﬀect these immigration policies is limited – although the
items in the DLES concern policies that are within the remit of Dutch
municipalities.
The relevance of this study, however, does not end at the borders of the
Netherlands. As indicated above, the theoretical patterns of political distrust
and non-participation of some national parties at the local level are likely to
apply to the success of independent political parties or lists in the Nordic
countries, Germany and Austria. Germany and Sweden are of particular inter-
est, because for a long time these countries also did not have anti-immigration
parties with a strong local basis, leaving space for independent local parties to
mobilise politically dissatisﬁed and alienated anti-immigrant voters. In Austria,
Denmark and Norway, right-wing populist parties have stronger long-term
representation in municipal councils. Future research may want to test to what
extent these predictions about similar countries hold. It may also be worth-
while to what extent the patterns found here apply to the UK, Ireland and
France with candidate-oriented electoral systems and Southern, Central and
Eastern Europe with their history of recent democratisation.
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Notes
1. This analysis excludes parties that are organised in between the local and
national level, such as the Frisian National Party (Fryske Nasjonale Partij, FNP), a
party which is only active on the municipal level, is included, in the analyses in
Appendix 4 this speciﬁc party is included in the analysis.
2. With exceptions for municipalities that have recently been merged or are
expected to be merged.
3. This does mean that voters who voted for parties that are organised at the
supra-municipal level as well as voters who voted for combined lists of two or
more national parties are counted as voting for a local party. Respondents
from municipalities where no elections were held in Match 2014 were asked to
think about the most recent election.
4. The ﬁrst group is formed by the four largest municipalities; these have more
than 300,000 inhabitants. The second group is formed by the following 37
municipalities; these have more than 80,000 inhabitants. The next group are
‘rural municipalities’ deﬁned by the CBS as having more than 500 addresses
per squared kilometre. Note that there are only two municipalities from the
three Northern provinces where municipal elections were held among the 41
largest municipalities. The municipalities in between the rural municipalities
and 41 largest municipalities are used as the reference category.
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Appendix 1. Questions in the DLES




Local identiﬁcation (1) To what extent do you feel connected to your ward or
village?
4
Local identiﬁcation (2) To what extent do you feel connected to your
municipality?
4
Local identiﬁcation (3) To what extent do you feel connected to your region? 4
National political trust (1) To what extent are you satisﬁed with the way democracy
functions in the Netherlands?
4
National political trust (2) How much faith do you have in the government? 4
National political trust (3) How much faith do you have in the lower house of
parliament?
4
Local political trust (1) To what extent are you satisﬁed with the way democracy
functions in your municipality?
4
Local political trust (2) How much faith do you have in the municipal council? 4
Local political trust (3) How much faith do you have in the local executive
council?
4
Local political trust (4) How much faith do you have in the mayor? 4
Economic scale (1) My municipality should allocate more money to maintain
social services.
5
Economic scale (2) My municipality should build more houses for rental
houses than houses that are meant to be owner-
occupied.
5
New cultural scale (1) My municipality should provide shelter for asylum
seekers.
5
New cultural scale (2) My municipality should reduce funding for arts and
culture.
5
Old cultural item In my municipality shops should decide for themselves
whether to open on Sunday.
5
Support for local autonomy (1) How much interest do you attach to the principle that the
municipality can decide over many issues
autonomously?
10
Support for local autonomy (2) How do you evaluate the implementation of the principle






Regional identiﬁcation Can you indicate to what extent you identify as Dutch
or as [provincial demonym]?
5
National political trust (1) How much faith do you have in the national
government?
5
National political trust (2) The national government advocates the interest of me
and others in my municipality.
4
National political trust (3) The national government represents the interest of me
and others in my municipality.
4
National political trust (4) Members of Parliament care for people like me. 4
Local political trust (1) How much faith do you have in the municipal
government?
5
Local political trust (2) Local politicians advocate the interest of me and others
in my municipality.
4
Local political trust (3) Local politicians represent the interest of me and others
in my municipality.
4
Local political trust (4) Municipal councillors care for people like me. 4
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Appendix 3. Additional Logistic Regressions Models based on
DLES
















Village identiﬁcation - - 0.76**
(0.34)
- -
Municipal identiﬁcation - - - 0.27
(0.37)
-
Regional identiﬁcation - - - - 0.34
(0.35)
Political interest - - - - -








National political trust −2.69***
(0.60)
- - - -
Local political trust 0.21
(0.55)
- - - -
Political interest × National political trust - - - - -
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Appendix 4. Additional Logistic Regressions Models based on
RNP with FNP in the Dependent Variable
(Continued).
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5








































N 972 972 960 960 960
Akaike information criterion (AIC) 908 962 905 910 909
0.1 > * > 0.05 > ** > 0.01 > ***









Political trust - −2.11***
(0.34)
National political trust −2.98***
(0.30)
-





























0.1 > * > 0.05 > ** > 0.01 > ***
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